Monday, June 22, 2009

Democracy vs. Theocracy

The more I read about the political situation in Iran, the more it seems to me there are serious ecclesiastic politics going on. The ayatollahs are either moving to supplant Kahmenei, or they are all turning against each other, scrambling to hold the regime together. I can't tell which, but it is fairly clear that the post-election rioting and protests in Iran pulled back the veil on much deeper political strife than may be apparent already.

It takes a little explaining to understand. Before I continue, I'd like to offer the primer I made for myself when I was trying to diagram the situation in Iran.

"The" Ayatollah

"The Ayatollah," as we know it informally refers to the Supreme Leader of Iran, currently Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Ayatollah is a religious title granted to Shi'ah clerics (priests) when they complete intense training, and achieve a level of enlightenment where they are considered divinely inspired, and able to issue their own religious edicts. There is no direct Western correlation, but the ayatollahs can be compared to Bishops or the Catholic Pope in terms of their ability to speak for God. It is the highest honor in the Shi'ah faith, save Grand Ayatollah, also known as a Marja, which is granted to ayatollahs who achieve a level of enlightenment wherein their writings (published as a "Juristic book,") are considered to be on par with the Qur'an. There are and have been always a few women who are considered to be of the rank of ayatollah, and are referred to as Lady Mujtahideh. There are at least 40 ayatollahs currently in Iran, many more worldwide, and three of the current twenty grand ayatollahs worldwide live in Iran. The concentration of highly venerated religious leaders in Iran makes the country one of "motherlands" of Shi'a Muslims.

Of note: there is some dispute over whether or not Kahmenei is an ayatollah or not. His title of Grand Ayatollah was required by the Iranian constitution in order for him to be appointed Supreme Leader, and it appears he found a political means by which to be granted both the title of ayatollah and grand ayatollah. He has been loudly denounced by some Muslim scholars.

How The Iranian Government Works

In descending order.
[Definitions courtesy of Wikipedia]

Supreme Leader of Iran: The Supreme Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts, which is also in charge of overseeing the Supreme Leader, and also has the power to dismiss him. As the name indicates, the Supreme Leader is considered as the ultimate head of the Iranian political and governmental establishment, above that of Iran's president. According to the constitution, he has the last say in internal and foreign policies, control of all of the armed forces, and control of state broadcast and others. The head of the Judicial branch is also directly appointed by him.

President of Iran: The President of Iran is the highest popularly elected official in the Islamic Republic of Iran, but is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran the president is responsible for the "functions of the executive", such as signing treaties, agreements etc. with other countries and international organizations; the national planning and budget and state employment affairs; appointing ministers, governors, and ambassadors subject to the approval of the parliament.

The Assembly of Experts: According to the Iranian Constitution, the assembly is in charge of supervising, dismissing and electing the Supreme Leader. In the event of his death, resignation or dismissal, the Experts shall take steps within the shortest possible time to appoint a new Leader. "Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in the Constitution, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed." The assembly has never dismissed a sitting Supreme Leader, and as all of their meetings and notes are strictly confidential, the assembly has never been known to challenge or otherwise publicly oversee any of the Supreme Leader's decisions.

Expediency Discernment Council: The Expediency Discernment Council of the System is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader and was created upon the revision to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran on 6 February 1988. It was originally set up to resolve differences or conflicts between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, but "its true power lies more in its advisory role to the Supreme Leader." According to Hooman Majd, the Leader "delegated some of his own authority to the council — granting it supervisory powers over all branches of the government" — following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election in 2005.

The Guardian Council: The Iranian constitution calls for the council to be composed of six Islamic jurists, "conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day" to be selected by the Supreme Leader of Iran, and six jurists, "specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Majlis from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power," (who, in turn, is also appointed by the supreme leader). It is charged with interpreting the Constitution of Iran, supervising elections of, and approving of candidates to, the Assembly of Experts, the President and the Majlis, and "ensuring ... the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly... with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution", i.e. veto laws passed by the parliament as the watchdog of the constitution.

Majlis of Iran: Currently, the Majlis' 290 members, five of whom represent non-Muslim religious minorities, are popularly elected for four-year terms. The Majlis can force the dismissal of cabinet ministers by no-confidence votes and can impeach the president for misconduct in office. Although the executive proposes most new laws, individual deputies of the Majlis also may introduce legislation. Deputies also may propose amendments to bills being debated. The Majlis also drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the national budget.

What does it all mean?

First and foremost, it means the Supreme Leader has almost total control of Iran. He (or potentially she) appoints the Guardian Council, who approve all elected candidates in all branches of government, including the Assembly of Experts, who in theory have the ability to remove the Supreme Leader from office. Second, it means the only governing body in Iran that has any real influence over the Supreme Leader is the Assembly of Experts, who are all ayatollahs. This would point to extreme solidarity except for the fact that Kahmenei is not really considered an ayatollah. He is the Supreme Leader, but his religious credibility and gravitas with the ayatollahs is shaky.

The President and the Parliament (the Majlis) are democratically elected. Although their candidacies are approved by the Guardian Council, all of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader, this does not mean they cannot act on their own once they are in office. President Ahmadinejad has certainly done so, and much to the chargin of the Supreme Leader, who has spent a good deal of Ahmadinejad's presidency either apologizing for his actions or battling him for legislative control of the government. This would make it seem that a reformer like Mousavi would be a welcome opponent, that Kahmenei would be in full support of him. However, what we see instead is the Ayatollah retreating inside the regime, supporting Ahmadinejad, and turning to the other ayatollahs to speak against rebellion.

However, not all the ayatollahs seem to agree with Kahmenei, or Ahmadinejad. In particular Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered the second most powerful person in Iranian politics, seems to have caused some dissent. His daughter and other relatives were arrested on Saturday at a pro-Mousavi demonstration. New sources are now saying they have been released, but even the arrest is shocking. Rafsanjani is a former president of Iran, and currently the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, in theory the person who could begin proceedings to dismiss Kahmenei. Rafsanjani has been and continues to be an important supporter of Mousavi, the defeated presidential candidate who has now become the figurehead in an increasingly hostile rebellion.

It is also known that there is no love lost between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, and it is reported that after Kahmenei confirmed the results of the presidential election, Rafsanjani called a meeting of the Assembly of Experts. Ayatollah Rafsanjani has made no secret that be believes Mousavi won the election, and tensions between Rafsanjani and Kahmenei have become impossible to conceal. It is even rumored that Rafsanjani may be considering appointing a new religious body to supplant the Supreme Leader. Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Majlis (or, equivalent to our Speaker of the House) has joined Rafsanjani, alleging that the Guardian Council intentionally falsified the election results in order to keep Ahmadinejad in office. The Guardian Council thus far, and likely under extreme pressure from Rafsanjani and his allies, have admitted that in as many as 50 cities, the vote tally exceeds voter registration. They have come up with multiple justifications for such an error, and it is doubtful any meaningful result will come of it, without further prodding.

What is important is that the opposition cause in Iran, headed by Mousavi, is gaining validity and credibility. Rafsanjani speaking in their favor is a big deal, and may be one of the hands staying further military action against the protest. With the head of the Iranian Parliament, Larijani also supporting the claims of election fraud, there is pressure from the top and the bottom -- the ayatollahs and the elected legislators squeezing from both directions. Rafsanjani has retreated to the holy city of Qom, where he is reported to be gathering his power base, a group of moderate and left-leaning ayatollahs, in a place considered to be the "papacy" of Iran. Asia Times reports:
Rafsanjani wants an emergency session of the 86 clerics-strong, no women, Council of Experts. Another crucial point: Qom as a whole is also not very fond of Khamenei. Khamenei was and remains an ultra-minor scholar; he was a mere hojjatoleslam when, through a white coup, he was installed as the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's successor. He's not a revered marja (senior spiritual leader) or a source of imitation.

Iranian Opposition Politician Ebrahim Yazdi also told Asharq Alawsat, a leading Arabic daily paper:
In Qom, Grand Ayatollah Saanei issued a fatwa prohibiting working with the Ahmadinejad government based on the consideration that it is an illegitimate government. He considers this “religiously prohibited.” Therefore, amongst grand Ayatollahs and members of the Assembly of Experts questions are being raised about the “validity of the Supreme Leader.” So the Assembly of Experts’ priority now is to be sure about the Supreme Leader and if they find that he is not valid then it has the right to dismiss him from his position. That is what the constitution says.

Yazdi was Iranian foreign minister in 1979, but was sidelined as religious hardliners came into power and shoved him out. He is currently head of Iran’s banned Freedom Movement. The movement is considered weak, and with little hope for success, however, if Yazdi sides with Rafsanjani, more legitimacy will be given to both his group, and the Mousavi-centered rebellion.

In closing, I will reiterate my original point: The more I read about the political situation in Iran, the more it seems to me there are serious ecclesiastic politics going on. The ayatollahs are either moving to supplant Kahmenei, or they are all turning against each other, scrambling to hold the regime together. I can't tell which, but it is fairly clear that the post-election rioting and protests in Iran pulled back the veil on much deeper political strife than may be apparent already. What I see is the ayatollahs struggling to come up with a way to preserve their cultural regime, and cooperate with democratic forces at work. Ayatollah Kahmenei seems to have played his entire hand on the establishment, but the establishment itself seems to be turning against him. Increasingly it appears to me that the protests in Iran are a symptom of what is happening inside the theocracy of Iran.

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