Ayatollah Calls For Executions

Ayatollah Kahmenei has called for the leaders of the protests in Iran to be executed. While I don't actually wish for any death or bloodshed, I kind of hope it happens. If the regime starts creating martyrs in an effort to quell the rebellion, it's on like Donkey Kong. I say, bring it. Do your worst. Viva la revolution!

Another Waffle From Kahmenei

Alsumaria Iraqi Satellite TV Network is reporting that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Kahmenei has extended the deadline for investigating complaints of election fraud by five days. This directly on the heels of his pronouncement that Iran would not "yield at any cost" to the opposition protests.

I'm telling you. Kahmenei has Ahmadinejad sitting on one shoulder, whispering about the status quo and Rafsanjani on the other shoulder whispering about change. And they're both threatening to castrate him if he doesn't listen. I'm not ready to make any predictions, but something is brewing inside the upper echelons of Iran's religious elite, and Kahmenei, who is likely shut out of most ecclesiastic deliberations, is flailing, looking for an anchor. No doubt Ahmadinejad sees himself as the next Supreme Leader, while Kahmenei is clearly attempting to establish a dynasty by appointing his son as his successor. I also think that the ayatollahs do not want Ahmadinejad as Supreme Leader because he is not a mullah or ayatollah, and they don't want another "political ayatollah" like Kahmenei in power. I also think Rafsanjani may well see himself as the next Supreme Leader, and in fact, if the rumors are true, we might see him declared such in Qom any day now. Rafsanjani certainly has the gravitas to rise to that highest post. Again, I'm not ready to make any all-out predictions, but this "rebellion" in Iran is far from over, and it is not only taking place in the streets.

Democracy vs. Theocracy

The more I read about the political situation in Iran, the more it seems to me there are serious ecclesiastic politics going on. The ayatollahs are either moving to supplant Kahmenei, or they are all turning against each other, scrambling to hold the regime together. I can't tell which, but it is fairly clear that the post-election rioting and protests in Iran pulled back the veil on much deeper political strife than may be apparent already.

It takes a little explaining to understand. Before I continue, I'd like to offer the primer I made for myself when I was trying to diagram the situation in Iran.

"The" Ayatollah

"The Ayatollah," as we know it informally refers to the Supreme Leader of Iran, currently Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Ayatollah is a religious title granted to Shi'ah clerics (priests) when they complete intense training, and achieve a level of enlightenment where they are considered divinely inspired, and able to issue their own religious edicts. There is no direct Western correlation, but the ayatollahs can be compared to Bishops or the Catholic Pope in terms of their ability to speak for God. It is the highest honor in the Shi'ah faith, save Grand Ayatollah, also known as a Marja, which is granted to ayatollahs who achieve a level of enlightenment wherein their writings (published as a "Juristic book,") are considered to be on par with the Qur'an. There are and have been always a few women who are considered to be of the rank of ayatollah, and are referred to as Lady Mujtahideh. There are at least 40 ayatollahs currently in Iran, many more worldwide, and three of the current twenty grand ayatollahs worldwide live in Iran. The concentration of highly venerated religious leaders in Iran makes the country one of "motherlands" of Shi'a Muslims.

Of note: there is some dispute over whether or not Kahmenei is an ayatollah or not. His title of Grand Ayatollah was required by the Iranian constitution in order for him to be appointed Supreme Leader, and it appears he found a political means by which to be granted both the title of ayatollah and grand ayatollah. He has been loudly denounced by some Muslim scholars.

How The Iranian Government Works

In descending order.
[Definitions courtesy of Wikipedia]

Supreme Leader of Iran: The Supreme Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts, which is also in charge of overseeing the Supreme Leader, and also has the power to dismiss him. As the name indicates, the Supreme Leader is considered as the ultimate head of the Iranian political and governmental establishment, above that of Iran's president. According to the constitution, he has the last say in internal and foreign policies, control of all of the armed forces, and control of state broadcast and others. The head of the Judicial branch is also directly appointed by him.

President of Iran: The President of Iran is the highest popularly elected official in the Islamic Republic of Iran, but is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran the president is responsible for the "functions of the executive", such as signing treaties, agreements etc. with other countries and international organizations; the national planning and budget and state employment affairs; appointing ministers, governors, and ambassadors subject to the approval of the parliament.

The Assembly of Experts: According to the Iranian Constitution, the assembly is in charge of supervising, dismissing and electing the Supreme Leader. In the event of his death, resignation or dismissal, the Experts shall take steps within the shortest possible time to appoint a new Leader. "Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in the Constitution, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed." The assembly has never dismissed a sitting Supreme Leader, and as all of their meetings and notes are strictly confidential, the assembly has never been known to challenge or otherwise publicly oversee any of the Supreme Leader's decisions.

Expediency Discernment Council: The Expediency Discernment Council of the System is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader and was created upon the revision to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran on 6 February 1988. It was originally set up to resolve differences or conflicts between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, but "its true power lies more in its advisory role to the Supreme Leader." According to Hooman Majd, the Leader "delegated some of his own authority to the council — granting it supervisory powers over all branches of the government" — following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election in 2005.

The Guardian Council: The Iranian constitution calls for the council to be composed of six Islamic jurists, "conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day" to be selected by the Supreme Leader of Iran, and six jurists, "specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Majlis from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power," (who, in turn, is also appointed by the supreme leader). It is charged with interpreting the Constitution of Iran, supervising elections of, and approving of candidates to, the Assembly of Experts, the President and the Majlis, and "ensuring ... the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly... with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution", i.e. veto laws passed by the parliament as the watchdog of the constitution.

Majlis of Iran: Currently, the Majlis' 290 members, five of whom represent non-Muslim religious minorities, are popularly elected for four-year terms. The Majlis can force the dismissal of cabinet ministers by no-confidence votes and can impeach the president for misconduct in office. Although the executive proposes most new laws, individual deputies of the Majlis also may introduce legislation. Deputies also may propose amendments to bills being debated. The Majlis also drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the national budget.

What does it all mean?

First and foremost, it means the Supreme Leader has almost total control of Iran. He (or potentially she) appoints the Guardian Council, who approve all elected candidates in all branches of government, including the Assembly of Experts, who in theory have the ability to remove the Supreme Leader from office. Second, it means the only governing body in Iran that has any real influence over the Supreme Leader is the Assembly of Experts, who are all ayatollahs. This would point to extreme solidarity except for the fact that Kahmenei is not really considered an ayatollah. He is the Supreme Leader, but his religious credibility and gravitas with the ayatollahs is shaky.

The President and the Parliament (the Majlis) are democratically elected. Although their candidacies are approved by the Guardian Council, all of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader, this does not mean they cannot act on their own once they are in office. President Ahmadinejad has certainly done so, and much to the chargin of the Supreme Leader, who has spent a good deal of Ahmadinejad's presidency either apologizing for his actions or battling him for legislative control of the government. This would make it seem that a reformer like Mousavi would be a welcome opponent, that Kahmenei would be in full support of him. However, what we see instead is the Ayatollah retreating inside the regime, supporting Ahmadinejad, and turning to the other ayatollahs to speak against rebellion.

However, not all the ayatollahs seem to agree with Kahmenei, or Ahmadinejad. In particular Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered the second most powerful person in Iranian politics, seems to have caused some dissent. His daughter and other relatives were arrested on Saturday at a pro-Mousavi demonstration. New sources are now saying they have been released, but even the arrest is shocking. Rafsanjani is a former president of Iran, and currently the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, in theory the person who could begin proceedings to dismiss Kahmenei. Rafsanjani has been and continues to be an important supporter of Mousavi, the defeated presidential candidate who has now become the figurehead in an increasingly hostile rebellion.

It is also known that there is no love lost between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, and it is reported that after Kahmenei confirmed the results of the presidential election, Rafsanjani called a meeting of the Assembly of Experts. Ayatollah Rafsanjani has made no secret that be believes Mousavi won the election, and tensions between Rafsanjani and Kahmenei have become impossible to conceal. It is even rumored that Rafsanjani may be considering appointing a new religious body to supplant the Supreme Leader. Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Majlis (or, equivalent to our Speaker of the House) has joined Rafsanjani, alleging that the Guardian Council intentionally falsified the election results in order to keep Ahmadinejad in office. The Guardian Council thus far, and likely under extreme pressure from Rafsanjani and his allies, have admitted that in as many as 50 cities, the vote tally exceeds voter registration. They have come up with multiple justifications for such an error, and it is doubtful any meaningful result will come of it, without further prodding.

What is important is that the opposition cause in Iran, headed by Mousavi, is gaining validity and credibility. Rafsanjani speaking in their favor is a big deal, and may be one of the hands staying further military action against the protest. With the head of the Iranian Parliament, Larijani also supporting the claims of election fraud, there is pressure from the top and the bottom -- the ayatollahs and the elected legislators squeezing from both directions. Rafsanjani has retreated to the holy city of Qom, where he is reported to be gathering his power base, a group of moderate and left-leaning ayatollahs, in a place considered to be the "papacy" of Iran. Asia Times reports:

Rafsanjani wants an emergency session of the 86 clerics-strong, no women, Council of Experts. Another crucial point: Qom as a whole is also not very fond of Khamenei. Khamenei was and remains an ultra-minor scholar; he was a mere hojjatoleslam when, through a white coup, he was installed as the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's successor. He's not a revered marja (senior spiritual leader) or a source of imitation.

Iranian Opposition Politician Ebrahim Yazdi also told Asharq Alawsat, a leading Arabic daily paper:

In Qom, Grand Ayatollah Saanei issued a fatwa prohibiting working with the Ahmadinejad government based on the consideration that it is an illegitimate government. He considers this “religiously prohibited.” Therefore, amongst grand Ayatollahs and members of the Assembly of Experts questions are being raised about the “validity of the Supreme Leader.” So the Assembly of Experts’ priority now is to be sure about the Supreme Leader and if they find that he is not valid then it has the right to dismiss him from his position. That is what the constitution says.

Yazdi was Iranian foreign minister in 1979, but was sidelined as religious hardliners came into power and shoved him out. He is currently head of Iran’s banned Freedom Movement. The movement is considered weak, and with little hope for success, however, if Yazdi sides with Rafsanjani, more legitimacy will be given to both his group, and the Mousavi-centered rebellion.

In closing, I will reiterate my original point: The more I read about the political situation in Iran, the more it seems to me there are serious ecclesiastic politics going on. The ayatollahs are either moving to supplant Kahmenei, or they are all turning against each other, scrambling to hold the regime together. I can't tell which, but it is fairly clear that the post-election rioting and protests in Iran pulled back the veil on much deeper political strife than may be apparent already. What I see is the ayatollahs struggling to come up with a way to preserve their cultural regime, and cooperate with democratic forces at work. Ayatollah Kahmenei seems to have played his entire hand on the establishment, but the establishment itself seems to be turning against him. Increasingly it appears to me that the protests in Iran are a symptom of what is happening inside the theocracy of Iran.

The Ayatollah Throws Down The Gauntlet

"Better the devil you know than the angel you don't." --Hama Tuma

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has an interesting choice (or had) in front of him. On the one hand, he has Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a leftist reformer, and former Prime Minister, of whom I'm sure Khamenei is thinking, I thought I got rid of you in 1989. On the other he has President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an extreme conservative with extensive political capital, who is slowly but steadily marginalizing the Ayatollah's power, and of whom I am sure Khamenei is thinking, I would love to get rid of you.

But to who? Mousavi, who stated clearly in his presidential campaign that he intended to greatly compromise the Supreme Leader's power through legislative power transfers? So which is worse? Being a puppet to Ahmadinejad, or being forced to share power with Mousavi, whose ideology you disagree with? The Ayatollah is more moderate than Ahmadinejad, and has wrestled with him more than once over Ahmadinejad's confrontational policies. Mousavi is far to the left of the Ayatollah, and the two have a history of clear animosity over social and cultural leadership. Both have a history with Kahmenei, and I would guess neither is particularly palatable to him.

In the space of a day, Khamenei went from ordering recounts in the Iranian presidential election, even using the word, fraud, to threatening "bloodshed" if the protests didn't stop. There is no way to know what is really going on in Tehran, but the Ayotallah's flip on the protests seem to me very sudden and inorganic.

It seems to me that Ahmadinejad was quick to regroup his power base and put pressure of the Ayatollah to side with him. At the same time as the existing regime was unifying against the protests, its leader, Mousavi began calling for further protests, in spite of new reports that violence is already breaking out. Iranian police and military forces have moved to quell the thousands of protesters with batons, tear gas and guns. Yet, still, the Ayatollah has allowed the Guardian Council (Iran's version of the Supreme Court) to continue their recount, and still sponsored a meeting today with the presidential candidates to discuss the election results. As I am writing this, a news brief has come out indicating that neither Mousavi nor Ahmadinejad attended the mediation, a clear line in the sand.

What happens now is anyone's guess. I personally think if the Ayatollah had thrown his full political weight behind the recount, the rebellion would be going on in the capitol instead of in the streets. It's a hard choice for any leader, and while I think he made the wrong one, it is very possible he had little real choice. Khamenei is flip-flopping, trying to evaluate his own place in the scheme of events. The gauntlet has clearly fallen in front of Mousavi and the Iranian people. The fact that there has now been confirmed bloodshed, and the first strike was made by the government, is a game changer. It means true revolt could be at hand, and the opposition will have self-defense as a shield. In the US, President Obama has stepped up his rhetoric, in spite of accusations from Iran of meddling, urging Iranian authorities to halt "all violent and unjust actions against its own people." He said the United States "stands by all who seek to exercise" the universal rights to assembly and free speech.

Back in March I wrote an article titled, Opening The Door To Iran, wherein I praised President Obama not so much for opening the diplomatic door to Iran, but for humanizing the Iranian people to the American people. I believe these protests, and the international attention they are getting in Iran, are doing that better than any video message could. News outlets are saying there are parallels in Iran right now to the 1979 revolution there. What I think Americans are seeing are parallels to our own presidential election in 2000. Election fraud perpetrated by conservative extremists, dueling law suits to curtail vote recounts, protests, threats of violence, and we all watched as Al Gore, the person who was universally seen as the victim, presided over the official confirmation of the usurper as President. Did Al Gore believe George W. Bush was the rightful winner? No, but he said he did, he put his signature on the electoral college documents, and he conceded. How do we know the Ayatollah isn't in Al Gore's position right now? Albeit by a different means, and within a different framework. I believe this is why the outrage, why the American interest in a country that three months ago was a "Muslim extremist nation," and a "state sponsor of terror." Now we see Iranian people, dressed in Western clothes, getting gassed by the police and "robbed" of "democracy."

Put bluntly, Ahmadinejad is a bad guy. He has regularly spoken for the dissolution of Israel as a Jewish state, and although he denies it, he is also a holocaust revisionist, claiming it never happened. He has been quoted saying Israel should be "wiped off the map." Even Greta Van Susteren seems to have made a Freudian slip and compared him to other fascist dictators, in this quote: "That doesn't sound like a good -- can I just tell you that doesn't sound like a good choice. We have either Ahmadinejad, who wants to destroy Italy -- Israel, rather -- Italy!."

Ahmadinejad supports the use of torture, regularly has dissidents detained without trial, and in 2006 he had multiple university professors dismissed who he believed to be speaking against him. In addition, Ahmadinejad's economic leadership of Iran has been generally deplorable, a point of great contention between himself and Mousavi in the presidential campaigns. Mousavi is credited with deft stewardship of Iran's coffers as Prime Minister, and the country enjoyed growth and prosperity as a result of his policies.

President Ahmadinejad is also a stalwart defender and advocate of Iran's nuclear program, which is most of what we knew about him before 2008, when Ahmadinejad and Iran were a persistent source of debate in the American presidential election. Ahmadinejad consistently claims that the Iranian nuclear program is for energy generation only, and persists in ordering uranium enrichment programs to continue, in spite of an United Nations Security Council resolution calling for them to halt. Mousavi on the other hand has called for an abolishment of the "moral police" in Iran, would pass laws protecting women, curtail government spending, open negotiations with the US, and claims that he would cease all hostilities toward Israel. Mousavi has indicated he would continue Iran's nuclear policies, however, claiming it is Iran's right (and maybe it is.) Interesting however, how we (Americans) don't care about that, probably didn't even know it; we care that Iranian citizens -- every day people like you and me-- are getting beat up by police and denied the right to free speech. We see our cultural values getting trampled, and understand that they are someone else's, too.

I've always believed that culture informs politics in a circular pattern, and that popular culture informs deeper, inherited culture. For the first time in contemporary history, Americans are seeing Iranians as people. We feel for them. We feel anger at the pictures coming out of Tehran and other cities. We see corruption that we can comprehend coming from the Ayatollah and President Ahmadinejad. Instead of veiled women and bearded clerics, we see Calvin Klein jeans and Twitter updates. In order for the United States to truly engage with Iran, regardless of the outcome of their situation today, popular sentiment needs to approve. And we've got plenty of that right now. I've already said that I believe President Obama could achieve successes with Iran on a scale with Richard Nixon's accomplishments with China. And, I believe the current uprising in Iran is the vehicle for that public support. If Ahmadinejad stays in office, it doesn't mean game-over. Not for anyone. Iran has been undergoing a social and political revolution for 100 years, and whether or not this is a flare-up or a full scale rebellion happening today, we now have proof in American eyes that Iranian people desire a freer society. And I hope they get one.